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1. MISTAKING AN OUTCOME FOR A COVARIATE
Donald Rubin’s lucid discussion of censoring by
death comments on several issues: he warns against
mistakes, describes obstacles to inference that might
be surmounted within a given investigation, and dis-
cusses barriers to inference that direct attention to
new data from outside the current investigation. Cen-
soring by death creates outcomes that are defined
only contingently, such as quality of life defined
only for survivors. If the contingency is an outcome
of treatment—if survival could be affected by the
treatment—then, as Rubin demonstrates, it is a seri-
ous analytical mistake to act as if the contingency were
a covariate, a variable unaffected by treatment, when
studying the effect of the treatment on the contingently
defined outcome. This is one instance of a family of
interlinked errors in which an analysis uses an out-
come of treatment as if it were a covariate measured
before treatment. Other instances in this same family
are adjusting for an outcome as if it were a covari-
ate (Rosenbaum, 1984), or attempting to define an in-
teraction effect between a treatment and an outcome
of treatment (Rosenbaum, 2004). One of the several
advantages of defining outcomes of treatment as com-
parisons of potential responses under alternative treat-
ments (Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974) is that it becomes
difficult to make these mistakes: outcomes exist in sev-
eral versions depending upon the treatment, whereas
covariates exist in a single version.
Figure 1 depicts the mistake Rubin warns against. It
is a simulated randomized experiment, with N = 650
subjects, of whom n = 325 were randomized to treat-
ment where 16 died, and m = 325 were randomized to
control, where 111 died, and Figure 1 depicts quality of
life scores for survivors. Beginning with the structure
as Rubin develops it, I will propose a somewhat dif-
ferent analysis. In Section 2 notation describes a com-
pletely randomized experiment of the type depicted
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FIG. 1. Comparison of quality of life.
in Figure 1, with censoring by death but without co-
variates; then Section 3 proposes a method of analysis
that separates empirical evidence of treatment effect
from diverging patient preference orderings of death
and various qualities of life.
2. CENSORING BY DEATH IN A COMPLETELY
RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT
There is a finite population of N subjects, i =
1, . . . ,N , who have given informed consent to be ran-
domized to receive either the treatment condition or
the control condition, where subject i would exhibit
response rT i under treatment or response rCi under
control. Write R for {(rT i, rCi), i = 1, . . . ,N} for the
potential responses of the N subjects, which are fixed
features of the finite population of N subjects. Of the N
subjects, a fixed number, n, with 1 ≤ n < N , are picked
at random for treatment, denoted Zi = 1, the remaining
m = N − n receiving control, denoted Zi = 0, so that
n = ∑Ni=1 Zi , and all
(N
n
)
possible treatment assign-
ments Z = (Z1, . . . ,ZN)T have the same probability(N
n
)−1
. The response, Ri , actually observed from i is
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rT i if Zi = 1 or rCi if Zi = 0, and the observed data
are O = {(Ri, Zi), i = 1, . . . ,N}. Here R is fixed but
O is random, and the distribution of O is created from
R by the known probability distribution used in the
random assignment of treatments. The task of infer-
ence in a completely randomized experiment is to say
something about the effects caused by the treatment,
R, from the observed data, O, and the known distri-
bution of treatment assignments. This commonplace
description of a randomized experiment is found, for
instance, in Welch (1937), and it merged certain ideas
from Fisher (1935) about randomization inference and
certain ideas from Neyman (1923) about treatment ef-
fects.
Following Rubin’s approach, I will understand “cen-
soring by death” to mean that the response is a numer-
ical measure of “quality of life” at a particular time,
say a year, after treatment, taking values in a subset Q
of the real line, but the measure is not defined if the
subject has “died” before that time, in which case the
letter “D” appears in place of the numerical measure,
so (rT i, rCi) could be a pair of numbers, a D paired
with a number, a number paired with a D, or a pair of
D’s. The mistake mentioned in Section 1 consists in
setting aside the D’s when studying quality of life, and
as Rubin’s discussion makes very clear, setting aside
the deaths means not estimating the effects of the treat-
ment on quality of life.
It is sometimes the case that deaths can be compared
ordinally to various qualities of life, even though nu-
merical comparisons are not possible; that is, Q ∪ {D}
may be a totally ordered set, with strict inequality ≺
and with equality-or-inequality , but the elements of
Q ∪ {D} cannot be manipulated arithmetically to yield
averages or expected values. One common view, per-
haps the default view, might order death as inferior to
any quality of life, and that view might have such di-
verse sources as religious teachings or the very differ-
ent observation that a living person can end his or her
life, so remaining alive with a given quality of life re-
veals a preference for that quality of life over death.
This common or default view is, no doubt, not univer-
sally held, and a particular person might order death
or D as preferable to the lowest or worst qualities of
life in Q. The analysis that I will describe can ac-
commodate any total ordering of Q ∪ {D}; it need not
place D below all of Q. Faced with diverse prefer-
ences among different patients, one can carry out the
proposed analysis with several different placements of
D in Q ∪ {D}, in which case the empirical results of
a single experiment might speak differently to differ-
ent patients, and each patient could select the analy-
sis that corresponds to that patient’s own evaluation.
This is illustrated in Section 3. When a total ordering
of Q ∪ {D} is possible, to what extent does it facili-
tate inferences about the effects caused by treatments?
More abstractly, what can be said about treatment ef-
fects when outcomes take values in a totally ordered
set that lacks algebraic operations?
3. THE QUALITY OF LIFE AMID DEATH
In the randomized experiment, we observe n of the
N potential responses to treatment and we do not ob-
serve m of the N potential responses to treatment, and
we observe m of the N potential responses to control,
but we do not observe n of the N potential responses
to control. Let RT (1)  RT (2)  · · ·  RT (n) denote
the ordered, observed responses to treatment, includ-
ing the D’s, for the n treated subjects, Zi = 1, and let
R˜T (1)  R˜T (2)  · · ·  R˜T (m) denote the unobserved,
ordered responses to treatment for the m control sub-
jects, Zi = 0. In Figure 1, there are 16 D’s observed
in the treated group, so 16 of the RT (i)’s are D’s,
and if deaths are placed below any quality of life by
, then the RT (1) = · · · = RT (16) = D. Similarly, let
RC(1)  RC(2)  · · ·  RC(m) denote the ordered, ob-
served responses to control for the m control subjects,
Zi = 0, and let R˜C(1)  R˜C(2)  · · ·  R˜C(n) denote
the ordered, unobserved responses to control for the n
treated subjects, Zi = 1. Note that, although R is fixed,
the RT (i), R˜T (j), RC(k) and R˜C() are random variables
with distributions created from R by random assign-
ment of treatments; moreover, the RT (i), R˜T (j), RC(k)
and R˜C() may be numbers in Q or the letter D.
Fix an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and consider the bivariate ran-
dom vector ϒ(i) = 〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉. Here, RT (i) is the
observed ith largest response of the n responses of the
n subjects randomly assigned to treatment, and R˜C(i)
is the unobserved ith largest response that would have
been observed from these same n subjects had they all
received the control instead, and either coordinate of
ϒ(i) may be a D. If n were odd and i = (n + 1)/2,
then ϒ(i) = 〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉 would compare the me-
dian of the n observed responses, including deaths,
to treatment among n treated subjects to the median
of the n unobserved responses, including deaths, that
would have been observed among these same n treated
subjects had they all received control instead of treat-
ment. Notice carefully that there may be no individ-
ual i with (rT i, rCi) = 〈RT (i), R˜C(i)〉, and the quantity
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RT (i) − R˜C(i) is not generally defined because either
RT (i) or R˜C(i) may equal D.
Because R˜C(i) is not observed, ϒ(i) too is not ob-
served. An exact, randomization-based confidence set
for ϒ(i) will now be defined. Recall that C(i) is a 1 −α
confidence set for an unobserved random vector ϒ(i)
if (i) C(i) is a function of the observed data, O, and
(ii) 1 − α ≤ Pr{ϒ(i) ∈ C(i)}; see Weiss (1955). Propo-
sition 1 rephrases a result due to Fligner and Wolfe
(1976, page 83, B; 1979); see Remark 2 following the
proposition. The confidence set for ϒ(i) is the observed
RT (i) and an interval for R˜C(i) formed from two of the
observed RC(j)’s. Notice that the interval may have one
or both endpoints as a D.
PROPOSITION 1 (Fligner and Wolfe, 1976, 1979).
If 1 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ m are two integers such that
1 − α =
b∑
j=a
(m+n−i−j
m−j
) (i+j−1
j
)
(N
m
) ,(1)
then C(i) = {〈RT (i), w〉 :w ∈ [RC(a),RC(b)]} is a 1−α
confidence set for ϒ(i).
REMARK 2. Fligner and Wolfe (1976) derive a
prediction interval for an order statistic from a future
sample starting from i.i.d. sampling of an infinite popu-
lation, but it is straightforward to derive their combina-
torial result, namely their Corollary 4.1 in Fligner and
Wolfe (1976), from random assignment of treatments
in a finite population, and from this, the coverage of
their prediction interval follows. Specifically, (i) start
by assuming the N fixed, ordered responses to con-
trol are untied, rC(1) ≺ rC(2) ≺ · · · ≺ rC(N); (ii) then,(m+n−i−j
m−j
) (i+j−1
j
)
of the
(N
m
)
possible random assign-
ments Z produce Table 1, yielding (1) in agreement
with Corollary 4.1 in Fligner and Wolfe (1976); (iii) fi-
nally, note with Fligner and Wolfe (1976, page 84) or
by other methods that ties among the rCi make the pre-
diction interval conservative.
At first, adopt the default view, that places death or
D below all qualities of life in Q. Then, in Figure 1,
TABLE 1
Cross-classification of untied potential responses to control, rCi ,
by treatment assignment, Zi , dividing at R˜C(i)
≺ R˜C(i) R˜C(i)  R˜C(i) Total
Treated i − 1 1 n − i n
Control j 0 m − j m
there are n = m = 325 subjects in each group, and
the RT (i) = D for i = 1, . . . ,16, RC(j) = D for i =
1, . . . ,111. With i = (n + 1)/2 = (325 + 1)/2 = 163,
the median observed response in the treated group is
RT (163) = 4.19. With a = 138, b = 189, expression (1)
equals 0.951, and [RC(a), RC(b)] = [3.81, 4.16], so the
95% confidence set for ϒ(i) is C(i) = {〈4.19, w〉 :w ∈
[3.81, 4.16]}. This 95% confidence set excludes the
possibility that, taking account of the unequal death
rates, the median quality of life score would have been
higher for the n = 325 treated subjects had they all re-
ceived the control instead, despite the appearance of
Figure 1.
Table 2 gives C(i) for i = 41, 82, 163, 244 and
285, for the eighth’s, quartiles and median. Notice
that for i = 82 for the lower quartile, the 95% confi-
dence set contrasts the observed lower quartile in the
treated group, RT (82) = 3.49, to an interval [RC(61),
RC(106)] = [D, D], so with 95% confidence the lower
quartile of the treated group would have been “death”
had all n treated subjects received control.
Consider now a hypothetical patient who views qual-
ities of life greater than or equal to 3.5 as better than
death, but qualities below 3.5 as inferior to death.
What does the same randomized trial say to such
a hypothetical patient with these hypothetical pref-
erences? In Figure 1, there are 66 treated patients
and no control patients with qualities below 3.5. As
a result, with this placement of D in Q ∪ {D}, the
RC(j) are unchanged, but the RT (i) reflect the new or-
der, with RT (i) ≺ D ≺ 3.5 for i = 1, . . . ,66, RT (i) =
D ≺ 3.5 for i = 67, . . . ,82, and D ≺ 3.5  RT (i) for
i = 83, . . . , n = 325. Then C(41) = {〈3.23, w〉 :w ∈
[D,D]} where 3.23 ≺ D so, with 95% confidence, the
lower eighth is worse if all n treated subjects had re-
ceived control, but C(82) = {〈D, w〉 :w ∈ [D,D]} so
the lower quartiles would be the same, and the remain-
ing three intervals in Table 2 are unchanged. With the
default order, treatment appeared superior, but with the
TABLE 2
Inference under the default order: 95% confidence
set C(i) for ϒ(i)
Quantile i (a,b) RT (i) [RC(a), RC(b)]
Lower eighth 41 (25, 60) 3.10 [D, D]
Lower quartile 82 (61, 106) 3.49 [D, D]
Median 163 (138, 189) 4.19 [3.81, 4.16]
Upper quartile 244 (221, 266) 4.79 [4.43, 4.94]
Upper eighth 285 (267, 302) 5.20 [4.98, 5.58]
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hypothetical order, control appears better at the lower
eighth and worse at the median.
Perhaps there is a correct placement of death, D,
amid the possible qualities of life, Q, or perhaps not.
Certain religious teachings would place D below all
of Q, but that view is not universal: Seneca (49 A.D.,
page 92), wrote: “He will live badly who does not
know how to die well.” The randomized experiment
in Section 2 provides no new insight into the proper
placement of D in Q ∪ {D}. However, for each given
placement of D in Q ∪ {D}, the experiment provides
information about how a group of n people will fare
under treatment and under control.
REFERENCES
FISHER, R. A. (1935). The Design of Experiments. Oliver and
Boyd, Edinburgh.
FLIGNER, M. A. and WOLFE, D. A. (1976). Some applications of
sample analogues to the probability integral transformation and
a coverage property. Amer. Statist. 30 78–85. MR0478462
FLIGNER, M. A. and WOLFE, D. A. (1979). Nonparametric pre-
diction intervals for a future sample median. J. Amer. Statist.
Assoc. 74 453–456. MR0548042
NEYMAN, J. (1923). On the application of probability theory to
agricultural experiments. Essay on principles. Section 9. Ann.
Agric. Sci. 10 1–51. (In Polish.) [Reprinted in English with dis-
cussion by T. Speed and D. B. Rubin in Statist. Sci. (1990) 5
463–480.] MR1092986
ROSENBAUM, P. R. (1984). The consequences of adjustment for a
concomitant variable that has been affected by the treatment. J.
Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A 147 656–666.
ROSENBAUM, P. R. (2004). The case-only odds ratio as a causal
parameter. Biometrics 60 233–240.
RUBIN, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in
randomized and nonrandomized studies. J. Educational Psy-
chology 66 688–701.
SENECA (49 A.D., 2005). On the Shortness of Life. Penguin, New
York.
WEISS, L. (1955). A note on confidence sets for random variables.
Ann. Math. Statist. 26 142–144. MR0090954
WELCH, B. L. (1937). On the z-test in randomized blocks and
Latin squares. Biometrika 29 21–52.
